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Abstract
This paper introduces a computationally efficient comparative approach to classical pricing
rules for day-ahead electricity markets, namely Convex Hull Pricing, IP Pricing and European-
like market rules, in a Power Exchange setting with non-convex demand bids. These demand
bids can, for example, be useful to large industrial consumers, and extend demand block
orders in use by European Power Exchanges. For this purpose, we show that Convex Hull
Prices can be efficiently computed using continuous relaxations for bidding products involving
start-up costs, minimum power output levels and ramp constraints, or analogous versions on
the demand side. Relying on existing efficient algorithmic approaches to handle European-
like market rules for such bidding products, we provide comparative numerical experiments
using realistic data, which, together with stylized examples, elucidates the relative merits of
each pricing rule from economic and computational perspectives. The motivation for this
work is the prospective need for mid-term evolution of day-ahead markets in Europe and in
the US, as well as the importance of day-ahead price signals, since these (spot) prices are
used as reference prices for many power derivatives. The datasets, models and algorithms
programmed in Julia/JuMP are provided in an online Git repository.
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1 Introduction
1.1 Day-ahead markets in the EU and the US
European electricity markets, and day-ahead markets in particular, will evolve in the coming years
as stakeholders have to cope with challenging issues such as the renewable energy revolution and
a growing complexity due to an increasing number of market players.
These real-world day-ahead electricity markets exhibit non-convexities in the underlying microe-
conomic/optimization models due to binary variables representing typical technical constraints
such as minimum power output levels and special cost structures such as start-up costs. Finding
a market equilibrium supported by uniform prices in such non-convex markets is known to be
impossible under general conditions, see e.g. [6, 23, 20, 13] and the examples in Section 2.2 below.
Uniform pricing means that in the market outcome, every market participant of a same market
segment (location and hour of the day) will pay or receive the same electricity price and no other
transfers or payments are considered. To circumvent this difficulty, near-equilibrium prices are
computed in practice, together with side payments where applicable. A given pricing rule speci-
fies the defining properties of such near-equilibrium prices, and these pricing rules have differing
computational complexity.
This article focuses on these microeconomic and computational issues and proposes a comparative
approach to key theoretical pricing rules representative of main ISOs in the US and European
Power Exchanges under the Price Coupling of Regions project. We first point out a few differences
regarding how these markets are organized in the US and in Europe.
Market structures on both continents differ by the nature and role of the stakeholders. For
example, day-ahead markets - which are the spot markets for electricity trading - are operated
in the US by Independent Systems Operators (e.g., PJM, MISO, ERCOT) which are non-profit
federally regulated organizations, while such markets are organized in the EU by Nominated
Market Operators (NEMO) in the European legislation. The CACM guidelines released by the
European Commission [1] describe the legal framework in which these NEMOs (e.g., EPEX Spot,
OMIE, Nord Pool) operate.
Also, it is well known that US markets allow market participants such as plant owners to describe
their technical constraints and cost structure in a more granular way than bidding products used
by European Power Exchanges. A particular example is the consideration of minimum up and
down times of a unit which can not be directly described with current European bidding products.
However, appropriately generalized (see the discussion in [13]), European bidding products can
be used to describe stylized unit commitment problems where market participants can incur start
up costs, minimum power output levels and ramp constraints. Compared to US markets, these
European markets also consider potentially non-convex demand orders. In the present article, for
comparison purposes, we will therefore consider bidding products including these key characteris-
tics. They essentially provide stepwise bid curves for each hour of the day, a minimum acceptance
ratio for the first step to describe a minimum power output level, and ramp constraints limiting
the increase or decrease of production between each hour. They also associate a fixed cost to a
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given family of such bid curves, which is used to model a start up cost.
1.2 Contribution and structure of this article
The contribution here is threefold. First, this paper shows that in the presence of startup costs,
ramp constraints and minimum power output levels, the convex hull of market participants’ fea-
sible sets are given by their continuous relaxations. Then, using the so-called “primal approach”
[23, 21, 7], Convex Hull Prices can efficiently be computed using continuous relaxations of the
primal welfare maximization, described in Section 3. Second, the paper technically and succinctly
describes Convex Hull Pricing and IP Pricing using unified notation in a context which also in-
cludes non-convex demand bids representing elastic demand, which is described in Section 3 and
Section 4 respectively. This is done in order to fit the “European power exchange setting” where
such kind of bids - though less general than those considered here - can be used by market par-
ticipants. European-like market rules are then discussed in Section 5 and references to previous
works providing state-of-the-art models and algorithms are provided. We argue in particular that
EU-like rules should be considered as a computationally-challenging variant of IP Pricing. Third,
these contributions are used to present stylized examples illustrating each of the three approaches
and highlighting advantages or potential drawbacks. Section 6 is devoted to large-scale numerical
tests comparing the three approaches from both the computational and economic perspectives.
To the best of our knowledge, such comparative numerical tests on large-scale instances for each
of these three key pricing rules, and in the presence of elastic demand, have not been proposed
in the literature. Finally, the source code and datasets used for computational experiments are
provided in an online Git repository [14].
2 Notation, basic examples and marginal pricing
We consider a social welfare maximization program (SWP) described by (1)-(5). For the sake of
conciseness, only one location is considered, but all the developments which follow can straight-
forwardly be carried out when multiple locations are connected through a transmission network
described by linear inequalities such as a DC approximation network model. Moreover, we con-
sider a model with a multi-period structure in order to explicitly consider ramp constraints in the
models below.
2.1 Notation and MIP model
The Social Welfare Maximization Program (SWP) is described by:
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max
(u,x)
∑
c
Bc(uc, xc) (1)
s.t.∑
c
∑
ic∈Ic|t(ic)=t
Qicxic = 0 ∀t ∈ T [pit] (2)
xc ∈ RI ∀c ∈ C (3)
uc ∈ {0, 1} ∀c ∈ C (4)
(uc, xc) ∈ Xc ∀c ∈ C (5)
where Xc is the set describing the technical constraints proper to participant c ∈ C, while B(.)
represents the costs of production (with B < 0), or the utility of consumption (with B > 0)
corresponding to production levels Qx < 0 or consumption levels Qx > 0. Here, xc ∈ RI is a
vector whose components xic correspond to the respective acceptance levels of several bids ic with
bid quantities Qic, or several steps of a step-wise bid curve (assumed to be monotonic, increasing
for offer orders and decreasing for demand orders), which will all be controlled by the binary
variable uc.
Regarding the sets Xc and the cost or utility functions Bc, we will consider the special case
corresponding to a stylized unit commitment setting where minimum output levels, start-up costs
and ramp constraints are considered, but not for example minimum up and down times, which is
more general than the bids considered in Europe. See [3] for a detailed description of the bidding
products currently proposed by European power exchanges.
For stepwise bid curves with an associated start-up cost (or utility of demand reduced by a constant
term), the utility or cost Bc are such that (1) is given by:
max
(u,x)
∑
c
(
∑
ic∈Ic
P icQicxic − Fcuc) (6)
The sets Xc are described by the following binary requirements and linear inequalities (7)-(13),
where conditions (9) describe minimum power output levels (the parameters ric ∈ [0; 1] are typi-
cally strictly positive only for the first step of an offer curve), while conditions (12) impose upward
limits on the output increase from one period to another and (13) impose downward limits on
output decreases (ramp constraints):
uc ∈ Z (7)
xic ≤ uc ∀ic ∈ Ic, c ∈ C [smaxic ] (8)
xic ≥ ricuc ∀ic ∈ Ic, c ∈ C [sminic ] (9)
uc ≤ 1 ∀c ∈ C[sc] (10)
u ≥ 0 (11)
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∑
ic∈Ic|t(ic)=t+1
(−Qic)xic −
∑
ic∈Ic|t(ic)=t
(−Qic)xic ≤ RUc uc
∀t ∈ {1, ..., T − 1},∀c ∈ C [gupc,t] (12)
∑
ic∈Ic|t(ic)=t
(−Qic)xic −
∑
ic∈Ic|t(ic)=t+1
(−Qic)xic ≤ RDc uc
∀t ∈ {1, ..., T − 1},∀c ∈ C [gdownc,t ] (13)
2.2 Examples
We now present two basic examples which will be discussed throughout the article, illustrating
key aspects both of markets with non-convexities and of the peculiar pricing rules considered in
our contribution. We first use them to show the mathematical impossibility in general of a market
equilibrium supported by uniform prices in the presence of non-convexities.
Example 1. We consider a market with two buy bids (A and B) and two sell bids (C and D)
where a minimum acceptance ratio, as described in Table 1, or a start up cost, as described in
Table 2, are associated to the sell bid C. We will refer to them later on as Examples 1.1 and 1.2
respectively. Both types of non-convexities can obviously be combined.
Figure 1: Instance with a ’non-convex bid’ C - start up cost or min. power output
Bids Quantity (MW) Limit price (EUR/MW) Min. Acceptance Ratio
A - Buy bid 10 300 -
B - Buy bid 14 10 -
C - Sell bid 1 12 40
11
12
D - Sell bid 2 13 100 -
Table 1: Instance with a minimum acceptance ratio (minimum power output level)
For example, the two toy examples presented above can readily be described as an instance of
(1)-(5) in the more special case described by (6)-(13): the left column below corresponds to the
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Bids Quantity (MW) Limit price (EUR/MW) Start-up costs
A - Buy bid (step 1) 10 300 -
B - Buy bid (step 2) 14 10 -
C - Sell bid 1 12 40 200
D - Sell bid 2 13 100 -
Table 2: Instance with start-up costs
instance of Table 1 and the right column to the instance of Table 2. Here, we drop the index i as
all the sets Ic involved are singletons.
Example 1.1:
max
x,u
(10)(300)xa + (14)(10)xb − (12)(40)xc −
(13)(100)xd
s.t.
10xa + 14xb − 12xc − 13xd = 0 (14)
xa ≤ ua (15)
xb ≤ ub (16)
xc ≤ uc (17)
xc ≥ (11/12)uc (18)
xd ≤ ud (19)
x ≥ 0 (20)
u ∈ {0, 1}4 (21)
Example 1.2:
max
x,u
(10)(300)xa + (14)(10)xb − (12)(40)xc −
(13)(100)xd − 200uc
s.t.
10xa + 14xb − 12xc − 13xd = 0 (22)
xa ≤ ua (23)
xb ≤ ub (24)
xc ≤ uc (25)
xd ≤ ud (26)
x ≥ 0 (27)
u ∈ {0, 1}4 (28)
The binary variables ua, ub and ud can readily be set to 1 and removed from the formulation: they
are associated to the simple “convex bids” A, B and D, and actually not required as it is always
optimal to set them to 1.
In the first case of a minimum acceptance ratio, the pure welfare maximizing solution is to accept
C at its minimum acceptance level of (11/12), that is to accept 11 MW from C, to fully accept
A, and to accept the fraction of B needed to match the accepted fraction of C. For a market
equilibrium to exist, the market price should be 10 EUR/MW, set by B which is fractionally
accepted: otherwise, there would be either some leftover demand from B if the price is below,
or B would prefer to be fully rejected if the price is above. However, at this market price, C is
loosing 11(40− 10) = 330 EUR and would therefore prefer not to be dispatched. Hence, there is
no market equilibrium with uniform prices in the present case.
In the second case of the presence of start up costs, it can be easily checked that the pure welfare
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maximizing solution is to fully accept A, fully reject B, and accept the fraction of C needed to
match A. Any level of acceptance of B would inevitably degrade welfare as the bid price of B is
lower than the bid price of any other offer bid, and also, it can be readily checked that discarding
C in order to avoid the associated start-up cost would also lead to less welfare (see the discussion
of European rules below). The optimal welfare is hence “the utility of A minus costs of the
production by C”, that is 10(300) − [10(40) + 200] = 2400. Here again, if there is any market
equilibrium supported by uniform prices, the price is set by fractionally accepted bids, here by C
at 40 EUR/MW. However, at such a market price, C doesn’t recover its start up costs and would
prefer to be rejected: there is no market equilibrium with uniform prices.
Let us note that in general, requiring equilibrium for the convex part of the problem, that is for
the “convex bids” which do not include start up costs or indivisibilities, as is the case for EU
market rules and IP Pricing may be questionable. This is further discussed in their respective
sections below. The following example aims at illustrating this aspect.
Example 2. This example is described in Table 3
Bids Quantity (MW) Limit price (EUR/MW) Min. Acc. Ratio
A - Sell bid 50 30 -
B - Buy bid 50 130 -
C - Sell bid 40 40 -
D - Sell block bid 200 60 1
E - Buy block bid 200 90 1
Table 3: Instance with non-intuitive ’IP pricing’ outcome
Concerning input data in this Example 2, let us recall that fully indivisible bids (so-called block
bids in EU markets) could correspond to real technical conditions of power plants as reported in
[19], p.9 concerning “combustion turbine units for which the minimum and maximum outputs are
the same.”
It could be straightforwardly shown, for example by solving the corresponding MILP problem,
that the welfare maximizing solution is here given by fully accepting A, B, D, E and rejecting
C.
If one imposes the constraints that the convex bids should be at equilibrium, as C is fully rejected,
the commodity market price must be less than or equal to 40 EUR/MW (the marginal cost of
C), and as A is fully accepted, the market price must be greater than or equal to 30 EUR/MW.
For such a market price in [30;40], D is “paradoxically accepted” with respect to the commodity
price. In the case of IP Pricing discussed below in Section 4, it would receive a compensating
“start up price” as a make-whole payment. However, intuitively, one may prefer to set the price
for example at 75 EUR/MW, in between the “marginal costs” and “marginal utility” of D and E
respectively, in which case no make-whole payment is needed. If the bid C which is not part of
the welfare maximizing solution is removed from the instance, such an outcome would correspond
to a market equilibrium based on the commodity price only.
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3 Convex hull pricing with ramp constraints
We now show how Convex Hull Prices (CHP) can be efficiently computed for the stylized offer
or demand bids presented above, including ramp constraints conditions. We also review their
general uplift minimizing property in that specific setting. Convex Hull Pricing was first proposed
in [6]. Ring has proposed [19] to minimize so-called uplifts – a formal definition is provided below
– made to market participants to compensate them from the actual losses or opportunity costs
they face at the computed market prices. The key contribution in [6] has been to show how to
compute market prices minimizing the corresponding required uplifts using Lagrangian duality (see
[5] on classical Lagrangian duality results). Prices obtained are sometimes also called Extended
Locational Marginal Prices (ELMP) [24, 21]. The approach is of current interest in the US, see
for example the contribution [21] by researchers at the ISO New England.
In what follows, for notational convenience, when a multi-period setting is considered, we still use
the compact notation applicable to a single-period setting, that is, formally:
pi
∑
ic∈Ic
Qicxic :=
∑
t
pit
∑
ic∈Ic|t(ic)=t
Qicxic
Given an optimal solution (u∗, x∗) and a market price pi, the uplift of participant c ∈ C is defined
as:
uplift(u∗c ,x∗c)(pi) :=
(
max
(uc,xc)∈Xc
[
Bc(uc, xc)− pi
∑
ic∈Ic
Qicxic
])
−
(
Bc(u
∗
c , x
∗
c)− pi
∑
ic∈Ic
Qicx
∗
ic
)
(29)
The interpretation is straightforward: the uplift is the gap between the maximum surplus par-
ticipant c could extract facing the market price pi by choosing the best option regarding only its
own technical constraints, and the surplus obtained with this same market price and the welfare
maximizing solution. This gap is trivially always non-negative.
The contribution [6] has shown that market price(s) such that the sum of all these uplifts is minimal
can be obtained by solving the Lagrangian dual of the welfare maximizing program (1)-(5) where
only the balance constraint(s) (2) have been dualized. Indeed, [6] considers a context where costs
of production to serve a given load y should be minimized, but can be adapted to our context
of two-sided auctions with both offers and demands. We review here this result, specializing the
model in [6] to the present context and notation.
Theorem 1. Let pi∗ solve the Lagrangian dual of (1)-(5) where the balance constraint(s) (2) have
been dualized:
min
pi
[
max
(uc,xc)∈Xc,c∈C
[∑
c
Bc(uc, xc)− pi
∑
c
∑
ic∈Ic
Qicxic
]]
(30)
Then, pi∗ solves:
8
min
pi
∑
c
uplift(u∗c ,x∗c)(pi) (31)
Proof. As the lower level program is separable in c ∈ C, the dual (30) can equivalently be written
as:
z∗ = min
pi
[∑
c
max
(uc,xc)∈Xc,c∈C
[
Bc(uc, xc)− pi
∑
ic∈Ic
Qicxic
]]
(32)
Let us observe that under constraint(s) (2), we have:
∑
c
Bc(uc, xc) =
∑
c
B(uc, xc)− pi
∑
c
∑
ic
Qicxic (33)
Hence (1)-(5) can equivalently be written with an arbitrary pi as:
w∗(pi) = w∗ = max
[∑
c
[
Bc(uc, xc)− pi
∑
ic∈Ic
Qicxic
]]
(34)
∑
c
∑
ic
Qicxic = 0 (35)
(uc, xc) ∈ Xc ∀c ∈ C (36)
By weak duality, w∗ ≤ z∗. Moreover, as now detailed, the duality gap DG = z∗ − w∗ exactly
corresponds to the sum of the uplifts, and solving the Lagrangian dual hence aims at minimizing
these. Again, let (u∗, x∗) be a welfare optimal solution, i.e. solving (34)-(36), then DG = z∗−w∗
can be written as:
min
pi
[∑
c
max
(uc,xc)∈Xc,c∈C
[
Bc(uc, xc)− pi
∑
ic∈Ic
Qicxic
]
−
∑
c
[
Bc(u
∗
c , x
∗
c)− pi
∑
ic∈Ic
Qicx
∗
ic
]]
(37)
or equivalently as:
min
pi
[∑
c
(
max
(uc,xc)∈Xc,c∈C
[
Bc(uc, xc)− pi
∑
ic∈Ic
Qicxic
]
−
(
Bc(u
∗
c , x
∗
c)− pi
∑
ic∈Ic
Qicx
∗
ic
))]
(38)
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This shows that solving the Lagrangian dual with the balance constraints dualized provides prices
minimizing the sum of the uplifts.
As first observed in [23] and more recently in [21] and [7], solving the Lagrangian dual can in
certain situations be reduced to solving the continuous relaxation of the primal (1)-(5). This
holds when this continuous relaxation is itself equivalent to the following “equivalent” formulation
(under rather mild assumptions requiring the Xc to be compact mixed integer linear sets, see [7])
of the Lagrangian dual to consider:
max
∑
c
B∗∗c,Xc(uc, xc) (39)
s.t.∑
c
∑
ic
Qicxic = 0 [pi] (40)
(uc, xc) ∈ conv(Xc) ∀c ∈ C (41)
where conv(Xc) denotes the convex hull of the feasible set Xc, and B
∗∗
c,Xc the convex envelope of
Bc taken over Xc, i.e., the lowest concave over-estimator of Bc on conv(Xc), see [7, Theorem 1] in
a different setting where costs are minimized instead of welfare maximized. See also the underlying
results in [4] used therein, or also [5] for equivalent results in a mixer integer linear setting. In such
a case, the optimal dual variables pi∗ related to the constraint(s) (2) of the continuous relaxation,
which can often be obtained as a by-product when solving this continuous relaxation, provide an
optimal solution to the Lagrangian dual (30).
Following [7], if Bc are linear functions (the marginal costs/utilities are constant), Bc and B
∗∗
c,Xc
have the same “functional forms” and we are only required to describe conv(Xc) appropriately.
This motivates the study of possible polyhedral representations for Xc, for instance, a review is
given in [7] which also considers quadratic cost functions and their convex envelopes over the
Xc.
In our context, as the Bc are linear functions, all we need is a description of conv(Xc) where the
Xc are given above by (7)-(13), which is stated in Theorem 2 below. The following Lemma is first
required:
Lemma 1. Consider a polyhedron P in Rn described by conditions Ax ≤ b and the set in R×Rn
X = {(0, 0)} ∪ {(1, x)|x ∈ P}. Then conv(X) = {(u, x) ∈ R× Rn| 0 ≤ u ≤ 1, Ax ≤ bu}.
Proof. As P is convex, the only case to consider is a convex combination of (0, 0) and (1, x) where
x satisfies Ax ≤ b (the other cases are trivial).
Any such convex combination can be written as (u, ux) for some 0 ≤ u ≤ 1. Moreover, for any
0 < u ≤ 1, Ax ≤ b⇔ Aux ≤ ub⇔ Ax˜ ≤ bu with x˜ = ux.
Hence conv(X) = {(u, x˜)|Ax˜ ≤ bu, 0 ≤ u ≤ 1} which proves the result.
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We come to a key Theorem which shows that Convex Hull Prices can be computed efficiently in the
presence of start-up costs, minimum power output levels, and ramp constraints. This follows from
the fact that the convex hull of each market participant’s feasible set is in this setting obtained
by taking the continuous relaxation in the space of the original variables and doesn’t require to
consider an extended space, i.e. adding auxiliary variables, to describe a set of which conv(Xc)
would be the projection. Note that we need to assume that minimum up and down times are not
considered, which is the case for the bidding products we consider here and which are slightly more
general than those proposed by European power exchanges. Describing the convex hull of market
participant’s feasible sets in the presence of minimum up and down times requires to consider
extended spaces and currently known formulations would be less efficient for large-scale instances;
see the review in [7].
Theorem 2. Consider the market participant’s feasible set Xc described by (7)-(13). Then
conv(Xc) is described by the continuous relaxation of Xc, i.e. by (8)-(13).
Proof. As uc = 0⇒ xc = 0, obviously, Xc = (0, 0) ∪ {(1, x)|Ax ≤ b} where the conditions Ax ≤ b
correspond to conditions (7)-(13) written with uc = 1 (appropriately choosing A, b).
The result is hence a direct consequence of Lemma 1.
Let us now observe the outcome Convex Hull Pricing (CHP) gives on the Examples described
above. In the context of Examples 1.1 and 1.2, the sets Xc are described by rcuc ≤ xc ≤ uc, uc ∈
{0, 1}, where rc is respectively (11/12) and 0. It is trivial to verify that in these cases, conv(Xc)
is described by its continuous relaxation, i.e. by rcuc ≤ xc ≤ uc, 0 ≤ uc ≤ 1 and this is also a
simple special case of Theorem 2.
Example 1 (continued): Convex Hull Pricing case
Example 1.1 (CHP case):
max
x,u
(10)(300)xa + (14)(10)xb − (12)(40)xc −
(13)(100)xd
s.t.
10xa + 14xb − 12xc − 13xd = 0 [pi∗ = 40]
xa ≤ 1
xb ≤ 1
xc ≤ uc
xc ≥ (11/12)uc
xd ≤ 1
x ≥ 0
0 ≤ uc ≤ 1
Example 1.2 (CHP case):
max
x,u
(10)(300)xa + (14)(10)xb − (12)(40)xc −
(13)(100)xd − 200uc
s.t.
10xa + 14xb − 12xc − 13xd = 0 [pi∗ = 56.6...]
xa ≤ 1
xb ≤ 1
xc ≤ uc
xd ≤ 1
x ≥ 0
0 ≤ uc ≤ 1
Hence, the outcomes are:
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Example 1.1 (CHP case):
1. Welfare maximizing solution: fully accept
A, accept (11/12) of C, accept (1/14) of
B, fully reject D.
2. Market price: pi = 40
3. Uplifts: no uplift for A, C, D, while B re-
quires an uplift of 30 EUR.
Example 1.2 (CHP case):
1. Welfare maximizing solution: fully accept
A, accept (10/12) of C, fully reject B, D.
2. Market price: pi = 56.6...
3. Uplifts: no uplift for A, B, D, while C re-
quires an uplift of
[(12)56.6..− ((12)40 + 200)]
− [(10)56.6..− ((10)40 + 200)]
= 0− (−33.333..) = 33.333..
One can readily check by solving the corresponding LP that the sum of the uplifts, respectively
of 30 EUR and 33.333 EUR, correspond to the duality gaps.
Example 2 (continued) : Convex Hull Pricing case
Finally, let us consider Example 2 presented in Section 2. Solving the continuous relaxation, i.e.
leaving aside that D and E can only be fully accepted or fully rejected, the optimal dual variable
value of the balance constraint gives an uplift minimizing price of 60 EUR/MW. Only C requires
an uplift, as at that price the participant would prefer to have the bid fully accepted, with a
surplus of 40(60 − 40) = 800 instead of 0, the uplift hence being of 800 EUR. Let us note that
one can consider market rules where only uplifts for actual losses and not those corresponding
to opportunity costs would be paid to market participants. Though the outcome may be here
more intuitive than when IP pricing is used (cf. the analogue example discussed in Section 4), the
price is still influenced by bids rejected in the welfare maximizing solution, as the uplifts could
correspond either to “opportunity costs” or to “actual losses” incurred.
4 IP Pricing
This Section presents IP Pricing in the power exchange setting with non-convex demand bids and
related notation considered in this paper. Compared to the historical exposition in [18], we also
explicitly consider the economic interpretations of the so-called “commitment prices” as potential
losses or opportunity costs of accepted or rejected non-convex bids respectively (see Propositions
1 and 2 below). These propositions are used to prove the equilibrium property of the IP Prices
given by Theorem 3.
IP Pricing was first introduced by O’Neill et al. in [18]. The proposition is to determine prices
by using the convex part of the welfare maximization problem: roughly speaking “marginal units
in the chosen unit commitment and dispatch are setting the price.” More precisely, the approach
proposed is to (a) maximize welfare, (b) fix all binary variables to the optimal values found, (c)
derive commodity (electricity) prices as optimal dual variables of the balance constraints - as
usual to determine locational marginal prices - and (d) start up prices (or commitment prices)
as optimal dual variables to the constraints fixing the binary variables to their optimal value.
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The key contribution is to show that the derived price system supports a market equilibrium if
the market rules specify that payments appropriately depend on both kinds of prices (Theorem 2
of the original paper). This equilibrium property is derived in Theorem 3 with the appropriate
settlement rule formally given in Definition 1 below.
The fact that the commodity prices are derived as optimal dual variables of the balance con-
straints in the restricted welfare maximizing problem where integer decisions are fixed implies
that “marginal units” (here whose production or consumption level is partial with regard to their
technical capabilities) are setting the price. This could be derived from the equilibrium properties
of prices obtained in well-behaved convex contexts such as for the welfare maximization programs
obtained once the binary decisions have been fixed.
We now formally derive these results and then illustrate them with our key toy examples, see the
continuation of Example 1 and Example 2 discussed below.
Let us consider the following fixing constraints given a partition of C in accepted bids Ca and
rejected bids Cr. In the original IP Pricing proposition, this partition is the one given by the
optimal solution to the primal welfare maximizing program (SWP):
uca = 1 ∀ca ∈ Ca ⊆ C [δca ] (42)
ucr = 0 ∀cr ∈ Cr ⊆ C [δcr ] (43)
The dual variables gupc,t and g
down
c,t associated to (12)-(13) do not exist for t = T or t = 0. However,
for technical convenience to develop what follows, we set gupc,0 = g
up
c,T = g
down
c,0 = g
down
c,T = 0.
The optimization problem dual to the welfare maximizing program where the uc have fixed values
(SWP-FIXED) described by (6) and conditions, (2), (8)-(9), (12)-(13) and (42)-(43), is given
by:
min
s,pi,δ
∑
ca∈Ca⊆C
δca (44)
s.t.
smaxic − sminic + (Qicgdownc,t(ic)−1 −Qicgupc,t(ic)−1)
+ (Qicgupc,t(ic) −Qicgdownc,t(ic)) +Qicpit(ic) = P icQic [xic] (45)
δca ≥
∑
ica∈Ica
(smaxica − ricasminica )− Fca +
∑
t
(RUcag
up
ca,t +RDcag
down
ca,t ) [uca := 1] (46)
δcr ≥
∑
icr∈Icr
(smaxicr − ricrsminicr )− Fcr +
∑
t
(RUcrg
up
cr,t +RDcrg
down
cr,t ) [ucr := 0] (47)
smax, smin ≥ 0 (48)
Lemma 2. The following identity holds for an accepted bid c (hence uc = 1) and decomposes the
profit or loss of the market participant c in terms of particular economic surplus variables:∑
ic
−Qic(pit(ic) − P ic)xic =
∑
ic∈Ic
(smaxic − ricsminic ) +
∑
t
(RUcg
up
c,t +RDcg
down
c,t )
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Proof. See appendix.
Proposition 1. For an accepted bid ca, the dual variable δca corresponds to the profit if positive, or
the loss if negative, of the market participant c, which is given by
∑
ica
−Qica(pit(ica)−P ica)xica−Fca
Proof. The complementarity conditions associated to constraints (46) satisfied by any pair of
respectively primal and dual optimal solutions are given by:
uca(δca −
∑
ica∈Ica
(smaxica − ricasminica ) + Fca −
∑
t
(RUcag
up
ca,t +RDcag
down
ca,t )) = 0 with uca := 1
Hence, δca =
∑
ica∈Ica
(smaxica − ricasminica ) +
∑
t
(RUcag
up
ca,t +RDcag
down
ca,t )− Fca and the results imme-
diately follows from Lemma 2.
Proposition 2. The dual variables δcr , when constrained by (47) to be positive, are upper bounds
on the missed profit of market participant c facing prices pit. Note that in all cases, it is straight-
forward to see that in the dual, one can always consider the optimal solutions such that (47) is
tight, as δcr doesn’t appear in the dual objective nor elsewhere in the dual.
Proof. Let x∗ic correspond to optimal decisions for c if it was committed under its own technical
constraints when facing given prices pit. In what follows, it is important to keep in mind that the
dual variables, roughly speaking the prices pit and related quantities on the “price side”, together
with the relations they satisfy, are given and independent of what would be “on the quantity side”
the optimal choices x∗ of c optimizing when facing them.
In case of commitment, uc := 1, and multiplying (12)-(13) respectively by the dual variables g
up
c,t
and gdownc,t , setting uc := 1 and summing the equations obtained gives:
∑
t
(RUcg
up
c,t +RDcg
down
c,t ) ≥
∑
ic
(
(Qicgdownc,t(ic)−1 −Qicgupc,t(ic)−1)x∗ic + (Qicgupc,t(ic) −Qicgdownc,t(ic))x∗ic
)
(49)
On the other hand, as smax, smin ≥ 0 and the parameters ric ∈ [0; 1], one has:
(smaxicr − ricrsminicr ) ≥ (smaxicr − sminicr ) (50)
Multiplying (45) by x∗ic, summing up over the ic and using the upper bounds given by (49) and
(50) shows after rearrangements that the right-hand side of (47) is bounded from below by the
missed profit:
∑
icr∈Icr
(smaxicr − ricrsminicr )−Fcr +
∑
t
(RUcg
up
c,t +RDcg
down
c,t ) ≥
∑
ic
−Qic(pit(ic) −P ic)x∗ic −Fc (51)
The result then follows from (47)
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The following Theorem states the equilibrium properties of the price system defined by pit (com-
modity prices) and the δc (commitment prices). It should be noted that Propositions 1 & 2 and
Theorem 3 hold whatever is the bid selection given by (42)-(43): nothing in the proofs relies on the
fact that the binary values in the fixing constraints (42)-(43) are those obtained as optimal values
of the welfare maximizing program.
As mentioned in the introduction to this Section, Theorem 3 shows that the non-uniform price
system (pi∗, δ∗) supports a market equilibrium provided the settlement rule is appropriately defined
as in Definition 1 below. It yields a market equilibrium in the sense that, given the market
rules and the price system, the market participants could not be better off by choosing other
production/consumption decisions satisfying their technical constraints.
Definition 1 (IP Pricing Settlement Rule). Given the market prices (pi∗, δ∗):
• each seller c is paid [
∑
ic∈Ic
pi∗t(ic)(−Qicxic)− δ∗cuc]
• each buyer c pays −[
∑
ic∈Ic
pi∗t(ic)(−Qicxic)− δ∗cuc]
Theorem 3 (analogue of Theorem 2 in [18]). For the price system given by pi∗, δ∗ obtained as
dual variables to the constraints (2) and (42)-(43) respectively, the primal decision variable values
(xc, uc) obtained in (SWP-FIXED) (given by (6) and conditions, (2), (8)-(9), (12)-(13) and (42)-
(43)) are solving (the first bracketed term correspond to payments and the second to costs or
utility):
max
uc,xc
[
∑
ic∈Ic
pi∗t(ic)(−Qicxic)− δ∗cuc]− [
∑
ic∈Ic
P ic(−Qicxic) + Fcuc] (52)
s.t.
(uc, xc) ∈ Xc, (53)
where again Xc is described by (7)-(13).
Proof. A formal proof is detailed in appendix. It essentially uses Propositions 1 and 2 and the
interpretation of the commitment price δ∗c to show that the value of u
∗
c given by the market
operator is optimal for the market participant c, and then to show that for this given value of
u∗c fixed, the values of the x
∗
ic given by the market operator are also optimal for the market
participant (relying on optimality conditions of the market operator welfare maximizing program
and the market participant profit maximizing program where in both cases u∗c is fixed).
Let us consider now the Example 1.1 above and its optimal solution: the market price is set to 10
EUR/MW by the convex bid B which is fractionally accepted, and the commitment price associated
to the constraint fixing the commitment binary variable uc = 1 is (- 330) EUR, corresponding to
the incurred loss to unit C at the given commodity market price. With the instance 1.2, the market
price would be 40 EUR/MW and the commitment price set to (- 200) EUR, again corresponding
to the incurred loss. These prices for the commodity and the commitments can readily be derived
as the optimal dual variables pi and δ (in square brackets) in:
Example 1 (continued)
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Example 1.1 (IP Pricing case):
max
x,u
(10)(300)xa + (14)(10)xb − (12)(40)xc −
(13)(100)xd
s.t.
10xa + 14xb − 12xc − 13xd = 0 [pi∗ = 10]
xa ≤ 1
xb ≤ 1
xc ≤ uc
xc ≥ (11/12)uc
xd ≤ 1
uc = 1 [δ
∗ = −330]
x ≥ 0
Example 1.2 (IP Pricing case):
max
x,u
(10)(300)xa + (14)(10)xb − (12)(40)xc −
(13)(100)xd − 200uc
s.t.
10xa + 14xb − 12xc − 13xd = 0 [pi∗ = 40]
xa ≤ 1
xb ≤ 1
xc ≤ uc
xd ≤ 1
uc = 1 [δ
∗ = −200]
x ≥ 0
Given these prices (pi, δ) = (10,−330) or (40,−200) respectively, participant C receives as a
payment pi(−Qcxc)− δuc (keeping the sign convention according to which Q < 0 for sell orders),
here respectively 10(11)−(−330)1 = 440 or 40(10) - (-200)1 = 600. In each case, it corresponds to
the production costs of C, and the primal decisions (uc, xc) are optimal for the market participant
C. They respectively solve the following profit-maximizing programs (cf. Theorem 3):
max
uc,xc
[pi(12)xc − δuc]− [40(12)xc] (54)
s.t.
xc ≤ uc (55)
xc ≥ (11/12)uc (56)
uc ∈ {0, 1} (57)
[pi := 10, δ := −330]
max
uc,xc
[12pixc − δuc]− [12(40)xc + 200uc] (58)
s.t.
xc ≤ uc (59)
xc ≥ 0 (60)
uc ∈ {0, 1} (61)
[pi := 40, δ := −200]
It may obviously happen that the committed units (i.e. such that uc = 1) are profitable at the
market price(s) pi, in which case the optimal dual variable δ∗ to the fixing constraint is positive. In
such a case, if strictly applied, IP pricing would require a payment pi(−Qcxc)−δuc, where −δuc is
negative and corresponds to a situation where the market participant gives its marginal rent back
to the Market Operator and makes zero profits, similarly to a pay-as-bid scheme. However, as
described in the original contribution [18, p.282] about the practice of the New-York Independent
System Operator NYISO and Pennsylvania–New Jersey– Maryland Interconnection (PJM), and
also in [22], market rules could specify that such profits can be kept by market participants. In such
a setting, IP pricing could be described as “marginal pricing plus make-whole payments” as only
losses are compensated, while market participants can keep rents if any at the given electricity
market prices. Note that this approach seems also close to the current practice in Ireland [2,
pp.40-43].
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Let us emphasize that according to the payment scheme described in Definition 1, no payment is
made to non-committed units since then u = 0 and x = 0. However, it may happen that rejected
bids are profitable at the commodity market prices, in which case δ is positive. In that situation,
the term −δu in the settlement rule makes the market participant indifferent to being committed
or not: if u was switched to one to allow a profitable generation of electricity, a corresponding
payment from the market participant to the market operator would occur offsetting these potential
profits. This is another - maybe surprising - aspect of the underlying idea of Theorem 2 in [18], and
the fact that for the obtained price system, optimal primal variables of the welfare program are
also solving the market participant’s profit-maximizing programs like (54)-(57) or (58)-(61).
On the other hand, concerning uplifts and considering the bidding products proposed in Europe
(so-called block orders), the reference [17] shows that with IP pricing, provided the welfare is
positive, a welfare maximizing solution is always such that there is enough welfare to finance
compensations paid to bids losing money, so-called “paradoxically accepted block orders,” if they
are allowed. This is also discussed in [12] and can be seen here by observing that by strong duality,
the welfare is equal to the dual objective in (44): if the welfare is positive, this means that the
sum of the δca such that δca > 0 is greater than the sum of the negative δca which correspond
to losses to compensated. Hence, there is always enough economic surpluses to compensate these
losses.
Finally, one recurring critique of the IP pricing approach is that it exhibits important commodity
price volatility [19, 20]. Intuitively, the reason is that the units which are marginal and hence
setting this price – and can have substantially different greater or lower marginal costs – can
quickly change with an increase of load. We argue here that it also leads to counter-intuitive
market prices, as Example 2 shows.
Example 2 (continued) : IP Pricing case
In the case of IP Pricing which seeks marginal pricing without any further restriction but considers
side payments to cover losses of market participants, the price would be “stuck” between 30
EUR/MW and 40 EUR/MW, respectively because of the acceptance of A and the rejection of C.
However, we have seen that a price of 75 EUR/MW would make sense as it supports a market
equilibrium once C is removed from the instance, and would appear as “fair” to all other market
participants, as in the discussion in Section 2.2.
This potentially counter-intuitive outcome is partially related to an arbitrary distinction between
bids including non-convexities and those which don’t, and the fact that convex bids cannot be
paradoxically rejected, while non-convex bids can be. As a consequence, rejected convex bids
impose conditions on market prices, while rejected non-convex bids do not.
It is also more generally related to the possibility for rejected bids, convex or not, to impact market
prices; a property related to Property 4 in [21], namely the possibility for offline generators to set
the market price (see Section D therein).
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5 European-like market rules
European market rules are intimately related to IP pricing proposed in [18]. They can be generally
described as IP Pricing plus the constraints that all start up prices (or commitment prices) δca of
committed plants - or more generally accepted non-convex bids - must be positive or null. This
means that a non-convex bid cannot be paradoxically accepted, while marginal bids are setting
the price. More precisely, this means that instead of considering a partition of accepted and
rejected non-convex bids (42)-(43) corresponding to the welfare maximizing solution, one only
considers those partitions for which the conditions just mentioned about the δc hold. Hence no
make-whole payments are needed. Most of the time, the welfare maximizing partition is then not
feasible. Also, non-convex bids can be paradoxically rejected and are not compensated for the
corresponding opportunity costs. This corresponds to a situation where the optimal dual variable
δc associated to the constraint of the form uc = 0 rejecting the bid is positive. Let us recall
that according to the IP Pricing rule, rejected bids are not compensated, as the payment of the
form pi(−Qxc) − δcuc is null if uc = 0, see the exposition of IP pricing market rules above. The
term −δcuc in the objective just makes the participant indifferent to being committed or not at
electricity market prices pi as there is no real opportunity costs according to the definition of the
payment rule.
Under these European rules, in Examples 1.1 and 1.2, the bid C must be rejected. Once rejected,
the market price is increased to 100 EUR/MW, and the bid C is paradoxically rejected in both
cases. The market outcomes in both cases is depicted on Figure 2.
Figure 2: A welfare sub-optimal solution satisfying European-like market rules for Example 1.1
and 1.2.
Let us note that in practice, there are hundreds of non-convex bids and only a limited fraction are
paradoxically rejected. However, due to the increase of so-called block orders submitted in recent
years, the number of these paradoxically rejected block orders has substantially increased and is
a source of concern for all stakeholders. See [10] for a study using real Belgian market data from
2015.
Let us now consider Example 2. The optimal solution under current European market rules is to
fully accept A and B, and to reject C, D, E. The market price must then lie in the interval [30; 40]
as A is fully accepted while C is a convex bid which is fully rejected and must hence be out-of-the
money or at-the-money (i.e. the bid price must be “not good enough”).
This can straightforwardly be shown using the following heuristic arguments. First, note that due
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to the bid quantities at hand, D is accepted if and only if E is accepted as well. However, if both
are accepted, as no losses could be incurred, the market price must lie in the interval [60; 90]. In
this case, A, B and C are all strictly in-the-money and should be fully accepted, which leads to
a contradiction as the balance constraint would be violated. So D and E must be both rejected
which sets no particular condition on the outcome (as they are non-convex orders which can be
paradoxically rejected), and it is then direct to check that given the bids A, B and C only, the
market outcome is the one just described above. As for IP Pricing, such an outcome may be
questionable.
These market rules lead to particularly interesting modeling and algorithmic issues related to
peculiar MPEC and MILP models, which have been studied e.g. in [13, 15, 12, 11].
6 Numerical experiments
The numerical experiments are aimed at assessing the different microeconomic and computational
tradeoffs offered by the historical pricing rules at hand. These experiments use realistic data
comparable to instances coupling the Spanish and Portuguese day-ahead markets, with adaptations
similar to those described in [13]: a minimum acceptance ratio has been added to the first step of
the offer bid curves associated to a non-convex bid, and the marginal cost associated to this step
takes into account information from an ad hoc variable cost which is provided in addition to the
marginal cost curves in real Spanish and Portuguese instances. These instances contain bids with
start-up costs, ramp constraints, step-wise marginal cost (resp. utility) curves and also a minimum
power output level specified via the minimum acceptance ratio mentioned above. Though a two-
node network is used here, more complex linear DC networks could be considered. The models and
algorithms have been implemented in Julia (ver. 0.6.2) using the packages JuMP.jl (ver. 0.18.0)
and CPLEX.jl (ver. 0.2.8), on a computer with an i7-8550u CPU (4 cores @ max 4 GHz) and 8
GB of RAM running Centos (RH Linux) 7, using CPLEX 12.7.1 as the underlying MIP solver.
These models and algorithms, together with datasets, are provided in an online Git repository, in
order to foster research on the topic [14].
6.1 Welfare, side payments, and computational efficiency
European-like market rules, which rely on uniform electricity prices, do not allow incurring losses
to market participants at these given prices, and hence do not require uplifts, i.e., discriminatory
payments, cf. Section 5. Avoiding such discriminatory payments has a cost in terms of total
welfare, as illustrated by the examples in Section 5. It has also a cost in terms of computa-
tional efficiency: compared to IP Pricing, not all non-convex bids selections are admissible (see
the discussion in Section 5) and the underlying combinatorial nature of the problem renders it
challenging computationally, though efficient formulations and algorithms exist [13, 3, 15, 12, 11].
In the numerical tests below, for European-like market rules, the Benders decomposition described
in [13] has been used.
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IP Pricing requires us to solve the pure welfare maximizing problem, which as a MILP is com-
paratively much easier to solve for very large-scale instances, and then a basic LP. In the present
context, the same holds for Convex Hull Pricing as the convex hull of market participants’ feasible
sets is given by the continuous relaxation. As a consequence, convex hull prices can be obtained
by solving the (dual of the) continuous relaxation of the welfare maximization program which is
an LP. However, in both cases, uplift payments are required to make participants whole and these
discriminatory payments might be not well accepted by market participants or raise non-trivial
implementation issues.
Tables 4 and 5 describe the characteristics of the instances used and presents numerical results
illustrating the trade-offs between welfare, run times, and the amount of uplifts (side payments)
required when IP Pricing or Convex Hull Pricing is used. The runtimes correspond in each case
to solving the full problem, i.e., the time needed to determine both quantities and prices for
the considered pricing rules. Let us note that the uplifts for Convex Hull pricing correspond to
both actual losses and opportunity costs of market participants, while uplifts for IP Pricing only
correspond to actual losses that should be compensated by definition of the settlement rule (see
Section 4). It could hence be possible for an instance to have more uplifts reported for CHP than
for IP Pricing, but counting the opportunity costs in the case IP Pricing is used would then show
that CHP truly minimizes deviations from a market equilibrium with uniform prices.
As can be seen in Table 4, uplifts required are very small compared to the amount of welfare, and
the same is true regarding the welfare losses when European pricing is used.
Inst # Non-Convex bids #Steps Welfare Welfare Loss upliftsCHP upliftsIP
(IP & CHP) (EU rules)
1 90 14309 115426705.6 11084.8536 288.7258 7393.944
2 91 13986 107705738.5 5003.636 439.193 5000.8
3 91 14329 113999405.5 2141.15356 1030.314 6648.373
4 92 14594 109951139.7 9466.60112 603.5169 5827.93
5 89 14370 107172393.2 7754.3366 72.63568 867.284
6 87 14389 123823967.6 3377.139199 239.3088 1835.88
7 89 14783 119386085.4 6964.017 329.5143 3116.86
8 86 14414 105372099.8 2187.674081 72.25676 951.5828
9 88 14860 96023475.04 2046.41408 778.3553 5275.138
10 86 14677 98212635.81 2597.8314 401.637 2313.78
Table 4: Welfares and uplifts (euros). The “Welfare Loss (EU rules)” column indicates how much
welfare is lost when European Pricing is used compared to the pure welfare optimal solution.
The instances at hand are “easy instances” compared to instances which include thousands of so-
called block bids, i.e., fully indivisible non-convex bids without associated start-up costs or ramp
conditions and which are used in the NWE region (e.g., Great Britain, France, Belgium, Germany,
Finland, Norway). For such more “combinatorial” and challenging instances, the difference of run
times to compute European Pricing outcomes versus IP Pricing or Convex Hull Pricing outcomes
can be much more substantial, as numerical tests presented in [10] illustrate, while conclusions
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regarding welfare losses and required uplifts would essentially be the same: both welfare losses and
required uplifts are rather small compared to the total welfare. The run times differences here are
also due to aspects related to model generation: for IP Pricing, the continuous relaxation of the
primal welfare maximizing program is used to compute prices (with the few additional constraints
fixing binary variables to their value), while a full dual program must be built for European Pricing
in order to test for the existence of electricity prices satisfying the constraints that no losses could
be incurred (cf. the Benders decomposition described in [13]).
Inst # Non-convex bids # Steps runEU runIP runCHP
1 90 14309 4.047098 2.202199 2.073478
2 91 13986 4.648906 2.081456 2.065098
3 91 14329 4.231441 2.294439 2.102532
4 92 14594 4.82378 2.050598 2.345987
5 89 14370 4.410432 1.860187 1.819655
6 87 14389 3.78953 1.907919 2.25707
7 89 14783 4.631189 2.104128 2.149526
8 86 14414 3.8165 1.842994 2.142367
9 88 14860 4.603193 1.943571 2.043593
10 86 14677 3.73881 2.0862 1.897801
Table 5: Run times for each pricing rule (in seconds)
6.2 Paradoxically accepted or rejected non-convex bids
Paradoxically rejected bids correspond to a missed trading opportunity, that is the market par-
ticipant could make more profits by selling (resp. buying) more. We hence take as a definition
of paradoxically rejected non-convex bids, bids such that in case of self-dispatch where the market
participant optimizes its production (resp. consumption) taking into account only its own tech-
nical constraints and the electricity market prices, she or he could be more profitable than with
the market operator’s decisions, by selling (resp. buying) more power. This definition slightly
reformulates the definition in terms of average prices usually given for “paradoxically rejected
block orders” in European markets, in order to make it applicable when Convex Hull Pricing
is considered. When Convex Hull Pricing is used, a market participant can sometimes be more
profitable by selling (resp. buying) less at some hours than what has been decided by the market
operator, without being fully rejected. This situation cannot occur with European or IP Pricing
as the continuous variable decisions made by the market operator are optimal for the market
participant once its binary “commitment variable” is considered fixed (roughly speaking, optimal
commitment decisions are made by market operators, then marginal pricing is used).
The issue of paradoxically rejected bids (PRBs) in European markets is well-known and of concerns
to market participants, see e.g. a discussion of the statistics of 2015 in [10]. Numerical results
presented below tends to show empirically what intuition could suggest (see for example the toy
examples discussed in Section 4 and Section 5): their number is on average reduced in the case
of IP Pricing and Convex Hull pricing, see Table 6. Experiments presented in [10] also show that
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this number is on average drastically reduced for very combinatorial instances involving a large
number of fully indivisible orders (so-called block orders in European markets).
This reduction of PRBs is at the expense of having paradoxically accepted bids (PABs), i.e. bids
incurring losses at the given electricity prices, which require uplifts to make participants whole.
Though this raises implementation issues regarding the uplifts, this situation may be seen as
preferable: a market participant is better with a paradoxically accepted bid for which an uplift
is received than with an opportunity cost in case the bid is paradoxically rejected. Note that by
definition, there are no paradoxically accepted bids with European Pricing. Let us also note that
for the instance #2, the fact that there is no PRB and no PAB with CHP doesn’t mean there is
a market equilibrium, and in fact Table 4 shows that the total deviation from an equilibrium is
439.193. Such an outcome could correspond for example to a case where a market participant,
while profitable, could be more profitable by selling less power at some hours of the day while still
satisfying its technical constraints: hence the corresponding bid is neither PAB nor PRB according
to the definitions given above.
Inst # Non-Convex bids pabEU prbEU pabIP prbIP pabCHP prbCHP
1 90 0 2 1 0 1 1
2 91 0 1 1 0 0 0
3 91 0 5 1 0 0 1
4 92 0 2 1 0 1 5
5 89 0 4 1 0 0 0
6 87 0 1 2 0 1 1
7 89 0 2 1 0 1 1
8 86 0 2 1 0 0 2
9 88 0 2 2 0 0 3
10 86 0 2 1 0 0 1
Table 6: Number of paradoxically accepted (resp. rejected) non-convex bids for each pricing rule
7 Conclusions
Convex Hull Pricing, IP Pricing and European-like market rules have been compared in a power
exchange setting with non-convex demand bids and bids including start-up costs, ramp constraints
and minimum power output levels. For this purpose, it has been shown that Convex Hull prices
can be efficiently computed by considering the continuous relaxation of the welfare maximizing
program and the associated dual variables when these stylized bidding products are considered.
Convex Hull Pricing and IP Pricing have also been technically described with unified notation
in such a two-sided auction setting, including the uplift minimizing property of Convex Hull
prices and the equilibrium property of IP prices once the appropriate settlement rule is specified.
This settlement rule relies both on electricity prices and on so-called start-up/commitment prices.
European-like market rules should be considered as a variant of IP Pricing where only non-convex
bid selections not incurring losses at the electricity market prices are considered, and this can
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be specified by imposing non-negativity constraints on so-called “start-up prices” associated with
committed units.
The European approach has the advantage of avoiding so-called uplifts which are discriminatory
payments that can raise implementation issues and concerns of market participants. Because
there are no uplifts, there may be less market manipulation possible, though this is an intuitive
statement. Investigating gaming opportunities under the different pricing rules is an interesting
venue for further research. Such an issue is also highlighted in [8], Section 5, or discussed in [9].
On the other side, the current European approach decreases welfare and is computationally much
more challenging. Numerical experiments have been conducted on realistic instances to assess the
trade-offs between the welfare losses in the case of European rules, and the uplifts required by either
IP Pricing or Convex Hull Pricing. It turns out that both are relatively rather small compared to
the total welfare. It also turns out that the number of so-called paradoxically rejected non-convex
bids under European market rules is on average reduced when IP Pricing or Convex Hull Pricing
is used. However, this doesn’t hold for all individual instances. This reduction of paradoxically
rejected non-convex bids is at the expanse of allowing so-called paradoxically accepted bids which
are bids which would incur losses given the electricity market prices, and hence require uplifts
to make participants whole. However, as mentioned above, the total amount of uplifts required
seem relatively small in practice. The outcomes IP and EU pricing exhibit on the toy examples
introduced in Section 2.2 are also questionable. At the light of these toy examples and the
numerical results, it seems that non-uniform pricing rules not relying on marginal pricing may be
preferable. The reference [16] proposes a so-called “revenue neutral” pricing rule, a property which
is also shared by the pricing rule introduced in [23]. These options should be further investigated
as they are computationally-efficient and could yield outcomes which are more relevant from an
economic perspective.
Other pricing rules have been proposed recently in the literature, and a better assessment of the
pros and cons of each approach in a real applied setting is still needed. As the pricing rules which
have been considered here are historical pricing rules taken as key references in the literature, the
present contribution aims at being a step in that direction.
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A Omitted proofs in main text
Proof of Lemma 2 [adapted from [13], Lemma 6 in Section 4]
Proof. The complementarity conditions associated to (8)-(9) are given by smaxic (uc − xic) and
sminic (xic−ricuc) where uc = 1 as the bid considered is accepted, which directly gives that smaxic xic =
smaxic (*) and s
min
ic xic = s
min
ic ric (**).
Multiplying (45) by xic and using the last two identities (*) and (**) yield:
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smaxic −ricsminic +(Qicgdownc,t(ic)−1−Qicgupc,t(ic)−1)xic+(Qicgupc,t(ic)−Qicgdownc,t(ic))xic+Qicpit(ic)xic = P icQicxic
(62)
On the other hand, complementarity conditions associated to (12)-(13) are respectively given by:
gupc,t
RUc uc − ∑
ic∈Ic|t(ic)=t
(Qic)xic +
∑
ic∈Ic|t(ic)=t+1
(Qic)xic
 = 0
∀t ∈ {1, ..., T − 1},∀c ∈ C (63)
gdownc,t
RDc uc − ∑
ic∈Ic|t(ic)=t+1
(Qic)xic +
∑
ic∈Ic|t(ic)=t
(Qic)xic
 = 0
∀t ∈ {1, ..., T − 1},∀c ∈ C (64)
Summing (63) to (64), then summing up over t and using the fact that uc = 1 as the bid considered
is accepted provides after rearrangement:
∑
ic
(
(Qicgdownc,t(ic)−1 −Qicgupc,t(ic)−1)xic + (Qicgupc,t(ic) −Qicgdownc,t(ic))xic
)
=
∑
t
(RUcg
up
c,t +RDcg
down
c,t )
(65)
The result of the Lemma is then obtained by summing up (62) over the ic ∈ Ic and using the
identity (65).
Proof of Theorem 3
Proof. Part I: u∗c is optimal.
In the first case where u∗c = 1, the alternative u
−
c = 0 yields a zero profit while for the current
value u∗c = 1, as δ
∗
c =
∑
ica
−Qica(pit(ica) − P ica)x∗ica − Fca according to Proposition 1, the profit
maximizing objective in (52) evaluated at (u∗c , x
∗
ic) is also 0 and hence u
∗
c = 1 is at least a value
as good as u−c = 0 (Part II below will show that it is indeed not possible to improve the profit
value with u∗c = 1 as the x
∗
ic are also optimal). Note that when δ
∗
c > 0, it corresponds to a
market participant profitable at the electricity market prices pi and the part of the payment given
by −δ∗cu∗c corresponds to a marginal rent given back to the market operator: market rules can
obviously specify that this marginal rent can be kept by market participants.
In the second case where u∗c = 0 and the profit is zero, considering the alternative u
−
c = 1 and the
associated optimal decisions x−ic, according to Proposition 2, δ
∗
c ≥
∑
ic
−Qic(pit(ic) − P ic)x−ic − Fc
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and hence the profit maximizing objective in (52) evaluated at (u−c , x
−
ic) is non positive: u
∗
c = 0 is
an optimal decision.
Part II: the x∗ic are optimal for u
∗
c fixed.
Let us first note that in the case where u∗c = 0, the xic are in all cases constrained to be null and
there is nothing to show (the values x∗ic = 0 are trivially optimal).
In all cases, let us consider (52)-(53) where (53) is given by the conditions (8)-(9), (12)-(13) and
where uc is considered as a parameter with the given value u
∗
c : hence, the objective (52) to
maximize is reduced to
∑
ic∈Ic
[P ic − pi∗t(ic)]Qicxic. Now let us consider the optimality conditions for
this problem given by the primal, dual and complementarity conditions. These dual conditions
are:
smaxic − sminic + (Qicgdownc,t(ic)−1 −Qicgupc,t(ic)−1) + (Qicgupc,t(ic) −Qicgdownc,t(ic)) = (P ic − pit(ic))Qic (66)
smax, smin ≥ 0 (67)
And the complementarity conditions are only those associated to the primal conditions (8)-(9),
(12)-(13), for the given c.
It is then straightforward to check that all these optimality conditions are part of the optimality
conditions for (SWP-FIXED) given by the objective (6) and conditions (2), (8)-(9), (12)-(13) and
(42)-(43).
Hence, the values x∗ic provided by the market operator are optimal for the profit maximizing
program of participant c with uc fixed.
Part I and Part II together proves Theorem 3.
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